Last received
The age of the most recent accepted report, not proof that the aircraft is still airborne. Older observations can remain visible during the selected history window.
DATA / CONFIDENCE / LIMITS
Layer400 shows radio observations made by participating receivers. This guide explains the route from broadcast to map, the meaning of common labels and the checks you should make before drawing a conclusion.
The age of the most recent accepted report, not proof that the aircraft is still airborne. Older observations can remain visible during the selected history window.
Values supplied by the broadcast. Height may be relative to take-off, ground or another reference depending on the standard and aircraft. Layer400 cannot guarantee survey-grade accuracy.
Broadcast motion at the reported time. Slow, hovering or stale tracks can make a heading unstable or unhelpful.
The radio transport reported by the station, such as Wi-Fi Beacon, Wi-Fi NAN or Bluetooth. A single aircraft can use more than one method.
The number of distinct participating stations whose accepted reports support the current observation. More receivers improve corroboration but do not authenticate the aircraft.
A match inferred from a declared serial pattern or other reference where available. “Likely†and “unknown†should be read literally.
Standard broadcast Remote ID messages can be received by nearby equipment, but ordinary reception does not establish that the contents are genuine. A transmitter can be misconfigured, copied, replayed or spoofed. Consumer radios can miss packets, and structures, terrain, weather, interference and antenna placement affect range.
Layer400 may calculate plausibility and confidence indicators from timing, movement and agreement between receivers. Those indicators describe the network’s evidence; they are not a certification of identity, legality or intent.
UNITED KINGDOM
The UK CAA says Direct Remote ID has been required from 1 January 2026 for UK1, UK2 and UK3 aircraft in the open and specific categories, and for UK5 and UK6 aircraft in the specific category. Its transition places relevant UK0, UK4/model, privately built and legacy camera aircraft on a 1 January 2028 date. Class, category, authorisation and exemptions matter.
Check current UK CAA Remote ID guidanceEUROPEAN UNION
EASA guidance says drones operating in the open category generally need direct remote identification, subject to limited exceptions. Requirements also arise for relevant class-marked aircraft and some specific-category operations. National implementation and the exact aircraft or operation still need to be checked.
Check current EASA open-category guidanceUNITED STATES
The FAA requires drones that must be registered to comply with Remote ID unless an exception applies. Compliance can involve a Standard Remote ID drone, a broadcast module, or operation without Remote ID within an FAA-Recognized Identification Area and its conditions. Each route exposes different information and has different operating limits.
Check current FAA Remote ID guidanceReceivers observe and forward radio messages. Layer400 then classifies them and applies the access rules for each product.
Available automatically on the live map when you sign in with a verified, enabled free account. No subscription or approval is needed. You can hide the layer. Anonymous maps, shared recordings and ordinary history do not include these coordinates.
Takeoff / Reference Position is a Type 0 report. Controller Location is a Type 1 dynamic GNSS report. Fixed Operator / Reference Position is Type 2. A reference point is not necessarily the current location of a person. Reserved types are not displayed.
Each marker uses the age of its own System message, not the latest drone position. Reports older than two minutes are removed. Reported System time and reception time remain distinct; when altitude is available it is labelled WGS84 height above the ellipsoid (HAE), not height above ground. No controller-position accuracy is invented.
Supplying a controller/reference position creates a restricted audit record linked to the account, session and source System observation. Disclosure records are kept for 180 days. Related request and IP security records are kept for seven days. Repeated delivery of the same observation to the same account and session in one minute is counted together; new observations and different accounts remain separate. Access is rate limited and ends on logout, expiry or account disablement.
This feature does not expose Operator IDs, full aircraft identifiers, radio addresses, raw messages, receiver identities or receiver locations. A business API entitlement does not grant access to restricted engineering evidence.
Physical TEST broadcasts travel through the real receiver and backend. They are retained in a bounded 48-hour engineering store and may appear in the separate, explicitly enabled TEST overlay. They do not count as genuine drones, enter ordinary playback, earn contributor credit or qualify aircraft for longer encounter retention.
Restricted evidence can contain original RID payloads, message fields, reception times and individual receiver provenance. Genuine raw evidence has not been shortened or deleted by this release and remains in preservation mode; this is not a guarantee of indefinite retention. Recovery correlation metadata is retained for 90 days. Playback and cached recordings are derived products, not complete raw archives.
Authentication pages can be received and reconstructed, but are not cryptographically verified. Radio reception, decoded content and inferred track identity are different kinds of evidence. Missing or unsupported fields remain identified as such.
Questions about this handling: [email protected].
The public map is a deliberately limited current view. Account access can add preferences and recent history. Contributor tools can show the health and performance of the contributor’s own stations. Professional features may add longer history, alerts, audit context or managed displays under additional controls.
No plan turns Layer400 into an aviation safety service or automatically makes an observation suitable as legal evidence. Organisations must define their own authority, purpose, retention, access, verification and human-review process.
If a track appears wrong, sensitive or misleading, record the public track reference, date and time in UTC, broad area and reason for concern. Do not publish a suspected operator’s details. Follow the corrections and reports process.